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I. Introduction 
One could argue that no right is held more dearly in our society 
than the freedom of speech that our First Amendment provides. 
Our courts have afforded speech the greatest deference, and have 
analyzed with the greatest scrutiny laws and claims attempting to 
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curtail that right.1 We as a nation have done this because we 
believe that robust conversations on these issues form the 
backbone of a functioning democracy.2 This has resulted in a vast 
and storied line of cases where our highest court has repeatedly 
protected the right to speak freely.3 Particularly, the Supreme 
Court has stressed that journalistic publications’ speech should be 
afforded the greatest deference because of its contribution to 
society.4 In doing so, the Court has frequently maintained that 
statutes seeking to restrict speech and claims seeking to hold those 
publications liable for speech are invalid.5 The Court has held that 
public figures bringing claims against publications will be subject 
to an even higher standard.6 Across decades of cases and among 
                                                                                                     
 1. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 725 (1971) (Brennan, 
J., concurring) (opining that the government cannot prevent a newspaper from 
publishing a story simply on conjecture that inconvenience or inappropriateness 
may result); see also Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) 
(promulgating a court order preventing the reporting of a polarizing murder trial 
unconstitutional because the heavy burden to secure prior restraint on freedom 
to speak and publish had not been met); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 
U.S. 377, 396 (1992) (finding unconstitutional a statute that criminalized cross-
burning because it sought to regulate the content of speech). 
 2. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (explaining that one of 
the undisputed goals of the First Amendment is the “free discussion of 
governmental affairs”). 
 3. See N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that 
the First Amendment did not permit imposing a restraint on publishing the 
“Pentagon Papers” when it was unclear whether publishing would “surely result 
in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people”); see 
also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958) (striking down a statute that 
required veterans to make a loyalty pledge to the government because it 
effectively penalized not engaging in a particular type of speech). 
 4. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281 (1964) (describing the 
importance of First Amendment protections to society); see also N.Y. Times Co., 
403 U.S. at 719 (explaining the paramount role that free speech and free press 
has in safeguarding the American people). 
 5. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 722–23 (1931) (finding 
unconstitutional a state law allowing prior restraint); see also Garrison v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77–78 (1964) (overturning a Louisiana law that punished 
true statements made with “actual malice”). 
 6. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 (requiring a public official to reach a higher 
threshold for establishing a defamation claim); see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. 
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (declining to deny First Amendment protections 
to speech that is clearly offensive and intended to inflict emotional injury when 
the speech could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating true facts about 
a public figure). 
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tort claims ranging from libel to infliction of emotional distress, the 
Court has repeatedly defended the media’s ability to publish free 
from fear of civil liability.7 To do otherwise would chill the free 
exchange of ideas and expressions that these publications 
contribute so strongly towards.8 In fact, it was a reaction to the 
restrictions put upon publications through licensing agreements 
by Great Britain that contributed to the codification of our First 
Amendment.9 This tradition shows that the decision in Bollea v. 
Gawker10 is objectively wrong. It is without precedent and violates 
the very nature of our constitution. In fact it directly contradicts 
precedent set in this particular area of law.11 It features a 
publication that published truthful facts about a public figure that 
had held himself out as a role model for children.12 For the 
publicized facts the publication was found liable for damages 
exceeding $100 million, which led to its bankruptcy and auctioning 
of its assets.13 Under no circumstance is this result just, in line 
                                                                                                     
 7. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 (invalidating civil penalties for a libel claim 
against a newspaper because otherwise it would chill free speech); see also 
Falwell, 485 U.S. at 108 (describing how imposing strict liability on a publisher 
for false facts would have a chilling effect on speech relating to public figures). 
 8. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 281–82 (indicating that the courts must protect 
First Amendment rights to criticize public officials, lest a chilling effect develop 
over the criticism of public officials). 
 9. See generally HIS MAJESTY’S STATIONARY OFFICE, ACTS AND ORDINANCES 
OF THE INTERREGNUM 1642–60, 184–86 (C.H. Firth & R.S. Rai eds. 1911) 
(authorizing the search, seizure, and destruction of materials offensive to the 
government). 
 10. See Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1204 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2014) (holding that the “circuit court’s order granting Mr. Bollea’s motion 
for temporary injunction is reversed because it acts as an unconstitutional prior 
restraint under the First Amendment”). 
 11. See Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., No. CV 98-0583 DDP (CWx), 1998 
WL 882848, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 1998) (granting summary judgment for 
defendants in a publication of private facts because showing short clips of a 
celebrity sex tape constituted newsworthy content); see also Haynes v. Alfred A. 
Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1234 (7th Cir. 1993) (granting summary judgment for 
defendants in a publication of private facts because publishing the facts of the 
plaintiff’s private “bedroom” life served a legitimate public interest). 
 12. See generally Eve Vawter, Hulk Hogan’s Apology Can Never Bring His 
Role Model Status Back, CAFEMOM (July 24, 2015), http://thestir.cafemom.com/ 
parenting_news/188369/hulk_hogans_apology_can_never (describing Hulk 
Hogan’s status as a role model in the 1980s) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 13. See Sydney Ember, Gawker, Filing for Bankruptcy After Hulk Hogan 
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with precedent, or commensurate with public policy. Without 
freedom of speech, all other constitutionally protected rights may 
be undermined. This is about protecting the free press, which in 
turn protects the populace by informing them of the truth so that 
they can make judgments for themselves. After all, an informed 
populace is essential to a functioning democracy. As Thomas 
Jefferson wrote “[o]ur liberty depends on the freedom of the press, 
and that cannot be limited without being lost.”14 
II. Background 
A. The Tape 
In the mid-2000s, Terry Bollea (Bollea) was visiting with his 
friend, Bubba the Love Sponge (Bubba), and Bubba’s wife, Heather 
Clem (Clem).15 Bubba convinced Bollea to engage in sexual 
activities with Clem.16 Bollea and Clem then proceeded to enter a 
bedroom where Bubba filmed their sexual encounter.17 Bollea’s 
awareness of the camera is disputed, but the tape lay inert for 
several years.18 In 2012, the film disappeared from Bubba’s home; 
it is unknown who took the tape and how the tape was removed 
from the home.19 The tape eventually made its way to the offices of 
                                                                                                     
Suit, Is for Sale, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2016/06/11/business/media/gawker-bankruptcy-sale.html?mcubz=1 (reporting 
Gawker’s filing for bankruptcy following its suit with Bollea) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 14. THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 12 VOLS. 503 
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904). 
 15. See Nick Madigan, Hulk Hogan Takes Stand in His Sex-Tape Lawsuit 
Against Gawker, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/08/ 
business/media/hulk-hogan-sex-tape-gawker-lawsuit.html?mcubz=1 (establishing 
the background facts of the Bollea-Gawker suit) (on file with the Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 16. See id. (regretting now that Bubba had convinced Bollea to engage in 
sexual activities with Clem). 
 17. See id. (“In his testimony, Mr. Bollea said he had been stunned to learn 
that the man he considered his best friend, who acknowledged having an ‘open 
marriage,’ might have used a camera installed in the bedroom to record the sexual 
encounter.”). 
 18. See id. (indicating that Bollea was unaware that a camera was recording 
the encounter). 
 19. See id. (suggesting the uncertainty as to how the tape was removed from 
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Gawker Media, LLC (Gawker), which released a short segment of 
the recording on their website with a corresponding article.20 
B. The Trial 
Following the release of the tape, Bollea initiated a suit in 
federal court for invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and copyright infringement.21 He asked the 
court for a temporary injunction to prevent the publication of the 
recording.22 The court summarily denied the temporary 
injunction.23 Following his loss in the Middle District of Florida, 
Bollea voluntarily dismissed his claim and brought a new claim in 
the state courts of Florida.24 The new claim was essentially 
identical to the one previously brought in federal court.25 The state 
appellate court similarly thwarted his attempts at another 
preliminary injunction by reversing the circuit court’s decision.26 
The state appellate court criticized the state circuit court’s 
understanding of privacy rights of public figures, noting 
                                                                                                     
the home and who actually recorded the tape). 
 20. See id. (“Mr. Bollea, who will continue testifying on Tuesday, openly 
discussed the video at issue in an appearance on a television show run by the 
website . . . .”). 
 21. See Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1327 (M.D. Fla. 
2012) (addressing Bollea’s claims of invasion of privacy by intrusion upon 
seclusion, publication of private facts, violation of the Florida common law right 
of publicity, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress). 
 22. See id. (discussing that, to prevent his own irreparable harm, Bollea 
asked for a preliminary injunction to remove published excerpts of the video and 
to enjoin further publication of the video). 
 23. See id. at 1331 (“Plaintiff has introduced no evidence establishing that 
he would suffer irreparable harm . . . absent injunctive relief . . . . [A]ny violation 
is best redressed after a trial on the merits rather than by a prior restraint in 
derogation of the First Amendment.”). 
 24. See Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2014) (explaining that on the same day that Bollea voluntarily dismissed his 
claim in federal court he instituted a claim in the state circuit court). 
 25. See id. (indicating that the claim brought in state court was “essentially 
the same” as the claim brought in federal court). 
 26. See id. at 1204 (concluding that the state circuit court’s granting of the 
preliminary injunction was invalid as an “unconstitutional prior restraint on 
speech under the First Amendment”). 
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particularly that Bollea had opened his private life up to the public 
through his wrestling celebrity status and his starring in a reality 
television program centered around his life and family.27 The court 
concluded that the interests of the First Amendment far 
outweighed the value of the injunction.28 
In March 2016, the trial finally began in the state courts of 
Florida.29 After two weeks of testimony and argument, the court 
tasked the jury with reaching a decision.30 The jury returned with 
a verdict in favor of Bollea, awarding him $140.1 million in 
damages.31 The unravelling of Gawker thus began. Following the 
massive jury award, both Gawker and its Chief Executive Officer 
Nick Denton filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.32 
Univision subsequently acquired Gawker’s assets in the August 
2016 auction that followed.33 After the sale, both parties reached a 
settlement for $31 million.34 But, the damage was done: civil 
                                                                                                     
 27. See id. at 1200 (establishing that Bollea meets the very definition of a 
public figure, and explaining that, as compared to private individuals, the privacy 
concerns of public figures often warrant a different standard of First Amendment 
protections). 
 28. See id. at 1204 (concluding that the temporary injunction violated the 
First Amendment as a prior restraint on speech). 
 29. See Yanan Wang, ‘Whatcha Gonna Do Gawker?’ Trials Begins on Hulk 
Hogan’s $100 Million Sex Tape Suit Against Gawker Media, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/03/02/whatcha-
gonna-do-gawker-trial-to-begin-on-hulk-hogans-sex-tapes/?utm_term=.8ff49eb425ef 
(noting that this would be the first ever celebrity sex tape case to make it to trial) 
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 30. See Tamara Lush, A Jury Sided with Ex-Pro Wrestler Hulk Hogan on 
Friday and Awarded Him $115 Million in his Sex Tape Lawsuit Against Gawker 
Media, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.usnews.com/news/ 
entertainment/articles/2016-03-18/closing-arguments-expected-in-hogan-gawker-
trial (describing the Bollea-Gawker trial) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 31. See Les Neuhaus, Total Damages in Hulk Hogan Sex Tape Case: $140.1 
Million, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-hulk-
hogan-20160321-story.html (detailing the aftermath of the Bollea-Gawker suit) 
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 32. Ember, supra note 13. 
 33. See Sydney Ember, Gawker and Hulk Hogan Reach $31 Million 
Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/ 
business/media/gawker-hulk-hogan-settlement. html?mcubz=1 (reporting on the 
settlement reached between the parties) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 34. See id. (“Gawker capitulated, settling with Hulk Hogan, whose real name 
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liability destroyed the publication.35 Liability had been imposed 
not for slander, libel, or defamation, but for the publication of 
truths.36 It signaled to some that Florida’s media laws had 
returned to the despotic ways of our persecuted forbearers.37 It is 
clear that this decision is not in line with precedent, public policy, 
or our nation’s goal of a free exchange of ideas.  
C. The History of Hulk Hogan 
One key factor that makes this case so divergent from 
precedent is that Bollea is a public figure.38 In order to fully 
understand Bollea’s role as a public figure, a brief history of his 
public career within the wrestling industry is required. Bollea 
began his wrestling career in Florida in the mid-1970s.39 Wrestling 
at that time was not as open as it is today; in fact, it functioned 
more as a closed business, similar to that of the mafia.40 Each 
region of the country was broken into several “territories,” with 
each territory typically controlled by a single promoter or a 
                                                                                                     
is Terry G. Bollea, for $31 million, according to court documents, and bringing to 
a close a multiyear dispute that stripped the company of much that once defined 
it.”). 
 35. See id. (indicating that the large award granted to Bollea forced Gawker 
into a bankruptcy auction). 
 36. See Neuhaus, supra note 31 (explaining that Bollea’s claim was based on 
the publication of a truthful video and not for inaccurate or libelous speech). 
 37. See Michael McCann, Hogan Lawsuit vs. Gawker Could have Massive 
Impact on Journalism, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 26, 2016), https://www.si.com/ 
more-sports/2016/05/26/hulk-hogan-gawker-lawsuit-litigation-finance-journalism 
(recognizing that the decision in Gawker presents troubling ramifications for the 
field of journalism as a whole) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 38. See Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2014) (establishing Bollea’s undisputed status as a public figure). 
 39. See SCOTT M. BEEKMAN, RINGSIDE: A HISTORY OF PROFESSIONAL 
WRESTLING IN AMERICA 120 (2006) (presenting a history of professional wrestling 
in the United States). 
 40. See id. at 84–85 (explaining how the territories banded together and 
colluded to protect the NWA Championship title); see also Graham Flanagan, The 
Epic Story of How Vince McMahon Created WWE and Conquered Pro Wrestling, 
BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/vince-mcmahon-
wwe-wrestling-territories-wcw-ted-turner-2016-11 (explaining the nature of the 
business of professional wrestling before McMahon purchased WWF from his 
father) (on file with Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
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syndicate of promoters.41 These territories were virtual monopolies 
in their respective areas and a territory’s respective promoter 
protected its value.42 Given the closed-off nature of this industry, 
it is unsurprising that Bollea experienced some difficulty in his 
introduction. During his first training session with Hiro Matsuda 
(Matsuda), a legendary Japanese shoot wrestler,43 Bollea suffered 
a broken leg.44 The business was so protected at that point that one 
would have to suffer an injury and return to show commitment to 
the sport and a willingness to protect its dirty secret. Although it 
is now known that professional wrestling is predetermined, that 
veil was first lifted publicly in 1989 by World Wrestling 
Entertainment’s (WWE) Vince K. McMahon (McMahon).45 
McMahon admitted to the predetermined nature of the sport to 
evade taxes associated with state athletic commissions.46 But, 
when Bollea began his professional wrestling career, the mystery 
of ”kayfabe” still veiled the sport.47 “Kayfabe” is the concept of 
predetermined events being portrayed as legitimate sporting 
events.48 This is represented in the wrestling industry in many 
                                                                                                     
 41. See BEEKMAN, supra note 39, at 118 (explaining the closed-off, territorial 
nature of professional wrestling pre-WWE expansion). 
 42. See id. at 118 (indicating that the “sanctity” of each promoter’s territory 
lay in their understanding that other promoters would not encroach on their 
territory). 
 43. See id. at 39 (describing “shoot” wrestlers as professional wrestlers who 
have real fighting skills). 
 44. See James Montgomery, Hulk Hogan on ‘Tough Enough’ and How Kevin 
Owens Made Him a Believer, ROLLING STONE (June 23, 2015), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/sports/features/hulk-hogan-on-tough-enough-and-
how-kevin-owens-made-him-a-believer-20150623 (expanding on the significant 
developments in wrestling training that have occurred since Hulk Hogan entered 
the business) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice); see also X-Wrestling Online, Hulk Hogan Talks About Hiro Matsuda 
Breaking His Leg, YOUTUBE (Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch 
?v=L294k7N3NM0 (providing Bollea’s own recounting of the Matsuda training 
incident) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice).  
 45. See BEEKMAN, supra note 39, at 131 (describing McMahon’s tactics in 
protecting the growing commercialization of his wrestling empire). 
 46. See id. at 131 (conceding that professional wrestling did not represent 
legitimate athletic competition). 
 47. See id. (explaining that many promotions viewed McMahon’s revelation 
to be the death knell of the business). 
 48. See id. at 40 (stating that “kayfabe” generally held up until the 1980s). 
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ways, but none is more telling than the motto of many wrestlers at 
the time: “keep kayfabe.”49 To “keep kayfabe” is to keep the public 
in the dark as to the true nature of the sport.50 The intense 
devotion to this credo partially results from the tremendous 
damage done to the sport following scandals that resulted in 
several Department of Justice investigations in the 1950s.51 The 
damage led to the sport’s fall from national prominence as it 
continued to lose ground to football and baseball in television 
markets across the country.52 
The popularity of wrestling would again rise to national 
prominence. The catalyst behind this return was the combination 
of two men: McMahon and Bollea. Following his recovery from his 
broken leg, Bollea returned to Matsuda to finish his training and 
begin his career in the Florida wrestling territories.53 After 
achieving some success in the Florida territories, the demand from 
other promoters for Bollea began to increase.54 Bollea was in a very 
advantageous position in that he was young, handsome, and 
gigantic. As a “blonde former bodybuilder,” he was the complete 
package that these promoters were looking for.55 His first exposure 
to McMahon took place in 1980, when McMahon’s father, Vincent 
J. McMahon (the promoter of the north east territory at the time) 
brought him in to work at Madison Square Garden (their 
promotions main hub).56 Over time, Bollea’s character, better 
known as Hulk Hogan, began to fully develop.57 He was given the 
Hulk moniker following a joint radio interview where both he and 
                                                                                                     
 49. See id. (reporting that “kayfabe” endured as long as it did despite 
exposés, defections, and governmental investigations). 
 50. See id. (tracing the “carnivalesque” roots of keeping business secrets from 
paying customers). 
 51. See id. at 98–99 (describing the DOJ investigations into cutthroat, 
monopolistic business practices aimed at independent promoters). 
 52. See id. at 93 (explaining the rise of baseball and football as a consequence 
of the advent of television). 
 53. See id. at 120 (noting Bollea’s early career in Florida). 
 54. See id. (describing Bollea’s progressive rise in the industry). 
 55. See id. (explaining that Bollea was McMahon’s most “important 
acquisition”). 
 56. See id. at 120 (detailing Bollea’s first encounter with Vincent K. 
McMahon). 
 57. See generally HULK HOGAN & MARK DAGOSTINO, MY LIFE OUTSIDE THE 
RING (2009). 
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Lou Ferrigno (Ferrigno), the star of the Incredible Hulk at the 
time, had been present.58 The host had remarked that Bollea was 
substantially larger than Ferrigno, and the “Hulkster” was born.59 
As his popularity increased internationally, Bollea was eventually 
brought into another one of the large American territories in 
Minnesota, the American Wrestling Association (AWA).60 Bollea 
did not return to New York because he had a falling out with 
Vincent J. McMahon over Bollea’s desire to play a role in the film 
Rocky III.61 Vincent J. McMahon did not want Bollea to perform 
the role and their professional relationship ended.62 The role 
proved to increase Bollea’s popularity in Minnesota and beyond, 
giving the wrestler his first exposure in the mainstream.63 He 
became one of the most popular and well compensated professional 
wrestlers in the history of the sport.64 However, his success, 
popularity, and wealth were only in its infancy, for he was yet to 
combine his efforts fully with McMahon. This combination would 
lead to wrestling reaching its greatest heights in popularity, 
profitability, and publicity. 
To understand what happens next in the story, you have to 
understand a little about the structure of professional wrestling in 
the country in the early 1980s. As stated above, the industry was 
divided into regional territories with each functioning as a mini-
monopoly in its small region.65 Some of these territories were very 
                                                                                                     
 58. See id. at 76–77 (“One day, I went on a local talk show and wound up 
sitting on-air right next to Lou Ferrigno.”). 
 59. See id. (“[S]itting next to me at that point in my life, the guy looked kinda 
[sic.] small. That blew Jerry Jarrett away. I got back to the dressing room after 
the show and Jarrett was like, ‘Good God, Terry! You were sitting on TV and you 
were bigger than the Hulk!’”). 
 60. BEEKMAN, supra note 39, at 131. 
 61. See Silver Screen Artists, HULK HOGAN in Rocky III . . . What Did It 
Do for Hogan’s Career?, SILVER SCREEN ARTISTS, http://silverscreenartists.com/ 
hulk-hogan-in-rocky-3-what-did-it-do-for-hogans-career/ (last visited Dec. 1, 
2017) (explaining that Bollea was fired from the WWF following his role in Rocky 
III) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Justice). 
 62. See id. (“After filming his scene for Rocky III against the wishes of Vince 
McMahon Sr., then-owner of WWF, Hulk Hogan was mysteriously ostracized by 
the organization shortly after the big screen appearance.”). 
 63. See BEEKMAN, supra note 39, at 131 (explaining how Bollea steadily 
increased his popularity through the role in Rocky III). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 118. 
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small, sometimes only existing in the metro area surrounding a 
major city.66 One such example included Houston Wrestling, run 
by Paul Bosch in the 1970s and 1980s.67 Houston Wrestling would 
run wrestling shows in and around the city of Houston.68 Their 
shows ranged in size and prestige from small shows in high school 
gyms to huge blockbuster shows in the Sam Houston Coliseum.69 
Along with running those shows, each territory would typically 
have a television program whose purpose was to promote the live 
shows held each week.70 Essentially the television program would 
serve as a commercial for the promotion’s weekly shows while also 
providing some advertising revenue to the promotion from the 
television station.71 Larger territories, such as the AWA and WWE, 
while having much larger geographic footprints than organizations 
like Houston Wrestling, typically respected the television rights of 
the smaller organizations.72 WWE and AWA traditionally only sold 
their television programs to networks within their geographical 
region (the Northeast and Midwest respectively).73 This all 
changed when McMahon took over the WWE from his father.74 
McMahon had a strategy to take wrestling national again and 
return it to its historical prominence.75 Bollea, as Hulk Hogan, was 
essential to this plan.76 The plan had several elements. First 
McMahon would begin by attempting to acquire the most popular 
                                                                                                     
 66. Id. at 110 (indicating that some territories consisted of a single metro 
area such as Dallas or Kansas City). 
 67. See generally Ken Hoffman, Glory Day of Paul Boesch’s ‘Houston 
Wrestling’ Now Online, HOUS. CHRON. (July 17, 2015), http://www.houston 
chronicle.com/life/columnists/Hoffman/article/Glory-days-of-Paul-Boesch-s-
Houston-Wrestling-6391434.php (describing author’s visits to Houston Wrestling 
and his experiences watching the events) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See BEEKMAN, supra note 39, at 131 (describing the relationship between 
larger and smaller territories in the national wrestling industry). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 119. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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wrestlers from around the country.77 These wrestlers were the 
current stars of the regional territories and were directly 
responsible for bringing in the audiences the smaller promotions 
required to maintain profitability.78 McMahon also contacted local 
television affiliates and made them an offer they could not refuse: 
McMahon offered to pay the affiliates to air his programs in the 
time slots occupied by regional promotional shows that the 
affiliates were currently paying for.79 Thereby the affiliates were 
turning an expense into an additional revenue stream. By doing 
this he stymied his competitors’ revenue generation in two ways: 
by signing their stars he diminished their live event revenue and 
by taking their television contracts he prevented ad revenue from 
reaching the promotions.80 The national rollout that would follow 
would completely transform the industry from one based on small 
regional promotions to that of national juggernauts competing for 
national attention.81 McMahon was not without competitors in his 
venture. Two of the other larger regional promotions also 
attempted to go national: Crocket Promotions (Crocket) out of 
North Carolina and Virginia and AWA out of Minnesota.82 Neither 
organization was able to compete, which led to the closure of AWA 
and the sale of Crocket to Turner Broadcasting (which was 
rebranded as World Championship Wrestling (WCW) and went on 
to compete with WWE successfully for nearly two decades before 
suffering a similar fate to other promotions and being forced to sell 
to WWE).83 
The creation of superstar that could captivate the country was 
central to McMahon’s plan. No man better fit that description at 
the time than Bollea as Hulk Hogan. Hulk Hogan was portrayed 
as good guy.84 This is important because wrestlers are typically 
                                                                                                     
 77. Id. at 121. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. at 121–22 (discussing that through this strategy, McMahon was 
able to pick “off promoters one by one”). 
 81. See id. at 121–24 (explaining the consolidation of promotions that was 
occurring at that time). 
 82. Id. at 122. 
 83. Id. at 129–30. 
 84. Id. at 123. 
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portrayed as either babyfaces (heroes) or heels (villains).85 
Promoters effectuate this distinction by portraying the characters 
in different lights and the characters’ actions.86 Hulk Hogan was 
portrayed as the ultimate babyface, an American hero who 
explained to his followers (the Hulkamaniancs) that if one “eats 
their vitamins and says their prayers” they will grow up to be as 
big and strong as the Hulk.87 Because of the “kayfabe” nature of 
the business, this was portrayed to be Bollea nature in real life.88 
As the centerpiece of McMahon’s plan to dominate the world of 
wrestling, Bollea was depicted as beating challenger after 
challenger.89 Because of his victories he served as a role model to 
a generation and became a household name around the world.90 
Bollea would go on to parlay the celebrity status he achieved as a 
role model in the WWE into many movie and television deals 
including: No Holds Barred, Mr. Nanny, and Eponymous Hogan 
Knows Best, among many others.91 
                                                                                                     
 85. See Torch Glossary of Insider Terms, PRO WRESTLING TORCH (2008), 
https://www.pwtorch.com/insiderglossary.shtml (providing the definitions for 
various wrestling terms) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 86. See Kaizar Cantu, Realism in Pro Wrestling: A Change of Heart, or the 
Babyface-Heel Dilemma, BLEACHER REP. (Dec. 17, 2011), http://bleacherreport. 
com/articles/987346-realism-in-pro-wrestling-a-change-of-heart-or-the-babyface-
heel-dilemma (“Through actions, technique and color schemes in ring attire, the 
average pro wrestling fan can define heel and face roles in a particular match 
from the very start.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
& Social Justice). 
 87. BEEKMAN, supra note 39, at 131. 
 88. See Frank Pallotta, Hulk Hogan on How Wrestling’s ‘Kayfabe’ Went Big 
Time, CNN, http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/07/media/hulk-hogan-wrestling-
testimony-gawker-trial/index.html (discussing how wrestlers stayed in character 
outside of the ring in front of fans) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights & Justice). 
 89. See id. (describing Bollea’s WWE character). 
 90. See Vawter, supra note 12 (explaining that Hulk Hogan fame was so 
great that he was the celebrity most often requested by the Make-a-Wish 
Foundation). 
 91. See Hulk Hogan, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0001356/ (last 
visited Dec. 4, 2017) (detailing a biography about Bollea and providing his 
filmography) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
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D. The Tort 
Bollea’s role as a voluntary public figure and role model for 
children is important to this particular case because the actions of 
public figures are more likely to be found newsworthy. The 
invasion of privacy tort is an invention of the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries.92 The concept developed following Louis 
Brandies and Samuel Warren’s article entitled The Right to 
Privacy.93 Their argument for a tort based on an invasion of 
privacy has slowly entered the legal field over the past 130 years.94 
The invasion of privacy tort comes in several flavors each 
governing different modes that the invasion could take.95 The 
Bollea case was brought under invasion of privacy by publication 
of private facts.96 One who “gives publicity to a matter concerning 
the private life of another is subject to liability if the matter 
publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person and (b) is not of a legitimate public concern.”97 
The tort implicates fundamental First Amendment issues and 
therefore has presented difficulties to plaintiff actions.98  
Publication of private facts contains three essential elements. 
The first requirement is that the fact be publicized—it must be 
disclosed to a third party in some manner.99 Second, the tort 
requires identification—the plaintiff must be identified in the 
disclosure to the third party.100 The third and final element of the 
                                                                                                     
 92. BRUCE M. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY, 11–12 (2d ed. Supp. 2015).  
 93. See id. (explaining that tort finds its origin in the law review article and 
that it has developed over time). 
 94. See id. (explaining that the tort has evolved over time with the 
development of technology and new mediums for news transmission). 
 95. See id. (indicating that there are “four judicially recognized types of 
invasion of privacy—intrusion, publication of private facts, false light and 
appropriation”). 
 96. See Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2014) (indicating that a portion of Bollea’s claim against Gawker was for 
invasion of privacy by publication of private facts). 
 97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). 
 98. See 1 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION 12–36 (3d ed. Supp. 2009) 
(explaining that some states have not adopted the tort and others have questioned 
its constitutionality).  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 12–42. 
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tort requires that the facts disclosed to the third party be private 
in nature.101 The tort also requires that the private facts not 
concern a matter of public concern.102 This provision serves more 
as a defense to the tort than as an element and is frequently what 
prevents plaintiffs from collecting damages.103 It becomes an even 
more pertinent defense and higher hurdle for plaintiffs to 
overcome when the plaintiff is a public figure.104 Courts have 
allowed almost all truthful statements about public figures to fall 
into the newsworthiness exception.105 It has been nearly 
impossible for public figures to recover monetary damages from 
publications based on the publication of private facts tort because 
of the newsworthy exception.106 
III. Argument 
Bollea is a public figure.107 He has been enriched by his fame 
and gained public goodwill as a role model for children.108 Being a 
celebrity does have some downsides that one must endure along 
with its benefits. One of those downsides is that your actions and 
inactions suddenly become matters of public concern.109 There is 
additional interest when the public figure occupies a special place 
                                                                                                     
 101. See id. at 12–34 (indicating that the facts disclosed must be both private 
“as a matter of fact and as a matter of law”). 
 102. See id. at 12–47 (explaining that newsworthiness could be more 
generally understood to mean of “general interest” to the public). 
 103. See id. (explaining that the newsworthiness exception provides “broad 
protection for publication of what otherwise appear to be embarrassing private 
matters”). 
 104. See id. at 12–49 (explaining that the lives of public officials and public 
figures are generally “subject to the greatest scrutiny”). 
 105. See id. (indicating because of the public’s general interest in the lives of 
public figures few statements about their private lives have been found to not fall 
in the newsworthiness exception). 
 106. See id. at 12–53 n.225 (listing the many times public figures have failed 
to succeed with the claim). 
 107. See Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2014) (explaining that it was undisputed that Bollea was a public figure). 
 108. Vawter, supra note 12. 
 109. See generally Rawlins v. Hutchinson Pub. Co., 218 Kan. 295 (1975) 
(explaining that both public figures’ and officials’ actions are a matter of public 
concern). 
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in society as role models do, particularly role models of children.110 
The public has a compelling interest in being able to learn if the 
public figure acts the same in their private lives as they claim to 
in their public lives.111 Because of that, Bollea’s actions were of 
public concern and fit squarely in the newsworthy exception. It 
would be highly likely that a parent would be interested in 
knowing if their children’s role model was involved in an 
adulterous affair with his purported best friend’s wife. 
As mentioned above, invasion of privacy by publication of 
private facts is an incredibly difficult tort from which to derive 
recovery.112 There are a number of reasons for why plaintiffs find 
recovery so difficult. The tort creates numerous First Amendment 
issues just from its existence.113 To lessen the torts impingement 
on the First Amendment, the courts through the common law have 
created the newsworthy exception.114 Newsworthiness 
traditionally carries several definitions. It has been “defined 
broadly to include not only matters of public policy, but any matter 
of public concern, including the accomplishments, everyday lives, 
and romantic involvements of famous people.”115 The plaintiff has 
the burden of proving that the information revealed was not 
newsworthy.116 
While there is no precedent that is based off facts identical to 
those of the Bollea and Gawker case, there are many others that 
have similar themes. Those cases almost always have ended with 
verdicts protecting the rights of publishers to broadcast, either in 
print or video, those truthful facts.117 From television producers 
                                                                                                     
 110. See id. at 298–300 (applying that reasoning to a police officer). 
 111. See generally id. 
 112. See SACK, supra note 98, at 12–53 n.225 (listing the many times public 
figures have failed to succeed with the claim). 
 113. See Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 691 (Ind. 1997) (stating that 
“Indiana Constitution commands real caution about proposals to recognize a civil 
cause of action for libel that impose liability for truthful statements”). 
 114. See Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp. Inc., 1998 WL 882848, at *7 (C.D. 
Cal. 1998) (indicating that the purpose of the “newsworthy privilege” is to protect 
the “First Amendment freedom to report on matters of public concern”). 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. (stating “plaintiff has the burden of proof to demonstrate that the 
matters publicized are not newsworthy, or that the depth of intrusion in private 
matters was ‘in great disproportion to their relevance’ to”). 
 117. See SACK, supra note 98, at 12–53 n.225 (noting the general trend of cases 
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who showed clips of a celebrity sex tape on a news program,118 to a 
former child prodigy whose privacy was invaded and had 
unflattering facts published about him in an article,119 to a man’s 
public outing in an article after he helped prevent the 
assassination of the President of the United States,120 every time 
a media publisher and her authors’ rights to publish truthful 
private facts have been upheld.121 In each one of these cases, and 
many more we will examine, the publisher’s right to publish has 
been defended by the privilege attached to reporting truthfully on 
newsworthy events. The threshold for the newsworthiness 
privilege is not particularly high, and it should have protected the 
Gawker organization, its editors, and its journalists. 
IV. The Genesis of the Tort and the Precedent 
A. Application of the Tort to the Old Media 
Privacy law is a relatively new invention of the twentieth 
century and therefore there is limited precedent from which to 
draw upon.122 From its inception, courts have attempted to balance 
the both the personal interest of the plaintiff in privacy with the 
public interest of dissemination of newsworthy information.123 
California’s first blush, but certainly not its last, with invasion of 
                                                                                                     
that deal with publishers’ rights to broadcast). 
 118. See Michaels, 1998 WL 882848, at *1 (explaining the facts of the case 
where clips of a celebrity plaintiff’s sex tape were shown on a news program and 
held to be newsworthy). 
 119. See Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 807 (2d Cir. 1940) (explaining 
the facts of the case where a reclusive former child prodigy was made the subject 
of a publicly embarrassing article and cartoon despite his wishes to the contrary). 
 120. See Sipple v. Chron. Pub. Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 666 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) 
(describing the facts of the case where a homosexual man had his sexual 
orientation revealed in an article against his wishes following his help in 
preventing the assassination of President Gerald Ford). 
 121. See Sidis, 113 F.2d at 807 (dismissing claim of former child prodigy); see 
id. at 1043–44 (upholding dismissal of claim brought by an involuntary public 
figure whose sexual orientation had been revealed). 
 122. See SANFORD, supra note 92, at 11–22 (explaining that privacy law is a 
relatively new field). 
 123. See Sidis, 113 F.2d 806 at 809 (attempting to balance the privacy interest 
of individuals with the press’s right to publish newsworthy stories). 
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privacy law occurred in 1931 with the production and release of the 
film The Red Kimono.124 Before reforming her life, the plaintiff, 
Gabrielle Melvin (Melvin), had been a prostitute.125 During her 
time as a prostitute she had been accused and later acquitted of 
murder.126 Sometime after the criminal trial, Melvin reformed her 
life and married, living in the words of the court an “exemplary, 
virtuous, honorable, and righteous life.”127 The film depicted her 
earlier life while using the plaintiff’s maiden name for the role of 
the title character.128 The plaintiff then claimed that the 
publication of these earlier facts about her life caused her great 
hardship through loss of reputation and abandonment by her 
friends when they recognized her name from the film.129 The court 
first had to determine whether California would recognize an 
invasion of privacy claim; after determining that it would, it then 
found for the plaintiff.130 The court explained their decision by 
stating that no moral or ethical code would permit or justify the 
publication of these facts about the private life of Melvin.131 Here, 
we see the genesis for the newsworthy exception in California. The 
court explains that if the film only contained facts from the murder 
trial that Melvin was acquitted of, it would have been immune to 
the invasion of privacy suit.132 By including details concerning 
Melvin’s life that were outside of the public record, the producers 
had crossed over into a forbidden territory and invaded the privacy 
                                                                                                     
 124. See Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 287, 291–92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931) 
(explaining the facts of the case where a woman’s life was depicted in an 
unflattering film titled The Red Kimono). 
 125. See id. (explaining that the plaintiff’s former occupation was a source of 
embarrassment for the plaintiff). 
 126. See id. at 286 (“It is alleged that appellant's maiden name was Gabrielle 
Darley; that a number of years ago she was a prostitute and was tried for murder, 
the trial resulting in her acquittal.”). 
 127. Id. 
 128. See id. (explaining that it was easy to discern for those in plaintiff’s 
community that she was the subject of the film). 
 129. See id. at 291–92 (indicating that plaintiff has suffered numerous harms 
in her community from the film’s revelations about her past). 
 130. See id. at 292 (articulating that the invasion of privacy by the defendants 
was not justified by any standard of “morals or ethics”). 
 131. See id. (indicating that the court could find no policy justification for 
using the name of the plaintiff in the film). 
 132. See id. at 291 (noting that the facts of the trial were a matter of public 
record and thereby implying that they are of a matter of public concern). 
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of Melvin.133 While not termed by the court at the time, one can 
easily interpret this decision to read that the defendants were 
being punished for publishing facts that were not of a public 
concern. If they had limited themselves simply to facts that were 
of public concern, the privacy suit would have failed. As we will 
see, a similar formulation for the yet unnamed newsworthy 
exception will be developed in several states over the decades 
following Melvin’s victory. 
When the courts of New York approached the same problem, 
they came to a different result, but used a similar methodology.134 
The New York court was interpreting a recently passed statute 
that would allow suit for use of the likeness of an individual “for 
trade purposes.”135 The court found that there was no violation of 
the statute because it did “not contemplate the publication of a 
newspaper, magazine, or book which imparts truthful news or 
other factual information to the public.”136 The court would also go 
on to explain their thoughts on the invasion of privacy tort itself, 
responding to the article written by Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis some fifty-five years earlier.137 The court stated:  
[W]e are not yet disposed to afford to all of the intimate details 
of private life an absolute immunity from the prying of the 
press. Everyone will agree that at some point the public interest 
in obtaining information becomes dominant over the 
individual’s desire for privacy. Warren and Brandeis were 
willing to lift the veil somewhat in the case of public officers. We 
would go further, though we are not yet prepared to say how 
far. At least we would permit limited scrutiny of the ‘private’ 
                                                                                                     
 133. See id. (explaining that the court’s decision lies in the fact that the 
defendant’s publicized facts about the plaintiff that were not included in the trial). 
 134. See Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940) (“But despite 
eminent opinion to the contrary, we are not yet disposed to afford to all of the 
intimate details of private life an absolute immunity from the prying of the 
press.”). 
 135. See id. at 810 (explaining that because a common cause of action for 
invasion for privacy had not yet been accepted by New York, the plaintiff’s claim 
would have to come under the statute). 
 136. Id. 
 137. See id. at 809 (indicating that the court’s belief over what would 
constitute an invasion of privacy is different from the on proposed in Warren and 
Brandies’ article The Right to Privacy). 
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life of any person who has achieved, or has had thrust upon him, 
the questionable and indefinable status of a “public figure.”138 
Herein lies the genesis of the newsworthy exception. Although not 
yet named as such, the court clearly contemplated that if the 
private facts publicized are of interest to the public at large, the 
interest of the public outweighs the privacy interest of the 
individual.139 The court expands the interpretation of Warren and 
Brandies to not just public officials, but also to those whose lives 
are of interest to the public: “public figure[s]”.140 William James 
Siddis, a former child prodigy of mathematics, was a public figure 
for the purposes of the court’s interpretation of an invasion of 
privacy tort.141 The court goes on to note that the article contained 
a “considerable popular news interest” that would qualify for 
newsworthiness.142 Probably because the court was in fairly 
uncharted territory, it cautioned its earlier statements with a 
disclaimer: 
We express no comment on whether or not the news worthiness 
of the matter printed will always constitute a complete defense. 
Revelations may be so intimate and so unwarranted in view of 
the victim’s position as to outrage the community’s notions of 
decency . . . . Regrettably or not, the misfortunes and frailties of 
neighbors and ‘public figures’ are subjects of considerable 
interest and discussion to the rest of the population. And when 
such are the mores of the community, it would be unwise for a 
court to bar their expression in the newspapers, books, and 
magazines of the day.143 
This cautionary statement served as an early bound to the 
liberality the newsworthiness exception was granted. The 
exception would continue over the rest of the twentieth century to 
                                                                                                     
 138. Id. 
 139. See id. at 809 (explaining the delicate balance between the right of the 
public and the private person’s right to privacy while also contemplating the 
different privacy rights of private persons and public figures). 
 140. See id. (stating that the court believes information of interest to the 
public about those individuals that have become public figures is newsworthy). 
 141. See id. (explaining briefly the nature of Sidis’ celebrity and his unusual 
and reclusive life that had made him the subject of the article).  
 142. See id. (describing that a former child prodigy’s status was newsworthy 
because it was the result of radical parenting methods that were publicized and 
the validity of those methods was newsworthy). 
 143. Id. 
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be expanded and further fleshed out, with boundaries and limits 
tested through litigation. The now charted boundaries of the 
exception should have shielded the publishers of Gawker from 
liability stemming from the publication of the Bollea tape. 
The Supreme Court approached this question in 1975 with its 
decision in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.144 The publication at 
issue in Cox was the dissemination of the identity of a deceased 
rape victim by a reporter.145 The Court fully understood the gravity 
of its decision and the two prime interests that were at stake, 
stating: 
Because the gravamen of the claimed injury is the publication 
of information, whether true or not, the dissemination of which 
is embarrassing or otherwise painful to an individual, it is here 
that claims of privacy most directly confront the constitutional 
freedoms of speech and press. The face-off is apparent, and the 
appellants urge upon us the broad holding that the press may 
not be made criminally or civilly liable for publishing 
information that is neither false nor misleading but absolutely 
accurate, however damaging it may be to reputation or 
individual sensibilities.146 
The perpetual balancing act that our First Amendment requires 
had again reared its ugly head and required the Court to determine 
if journalists could be punished for publishing true facts.147 The 
Court held that because those facts were publicly available, there 
was no invasion of privacy.148 Nonetheless, in addition to this 
decision, the Court indicated that a privilege exists for journalist 
                                                                                                     
 144. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) (holding that 
“the First and Fourteenth Amendments will not allow exposing the press to 
liability for truthfully publishing information released to the public in official 
court records”). 
 145. See id. at 471–73 (stating the background of the case, that the reporter 
had learned the identity of the victim from court documents that were in public 
record). 
 146. Id. at 489. 
 147. See id. at 471–74 (“[W]hether, consistently with the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments, a State may extend a cause of action for damages for invasion of 
privacy caused by the publication of the name of a deceased rape victim which 
was publicly revealed in connection with the prosecution of the crime.”). 
 148. See id. at 495–96 (explaining that the information contained in public 
records has presumably been placed there for the public good and therefore its 
dissemination neither harms the public nor constitutes an invasion of privacy). 
236 24 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 215 (2017) 
publicizing truthful facts.149 The Court recognized the important 
function that the press plays in a functioning democracy, and to 
fully function in that role the press must be free to publicize 
truthful newsworthy facts without fear of civil liability.150 Because 
of this important function of the press, this First Amendment 
privilege would be entrenched in the common law as the 
newsworthy exception. 
In 1989 the Supreme Court again weighed in on a claim 
against a publication for printing private facts.151 This time, the 
Court examined a negligence per se claim based on a misdemeanor 
statute that criminalized the publication of the names of sexual 
assault victims.152 The case involved the publication of a rape 
victim’s name from a police report that was in the police 
department’s pressroom.153 A reporter-trainee from The Florida 
Star then transcribed the police report and passed it on to a 
journalist, who then wrote a short news story on the crime and 
included the victim’s name.154 The named victim then brought a 
negligence per se claim against the paper and was awarded 
$100,000 in damages.155 On appeal the Supreme Court ruled that 
imposing civil penalties based on the facts of the case violated the 
First Amendment.156 In doing so the Supreme Court applied the 
                                                                                                     
 149. See id. at 489–90 (recognizing a privilege exists and applying it to a 
publication of private facts tort claim). 
 150. See id. at 491–92 (stating that the press plays an important role in 
providing oversight and disseminating information about the courts to the 
public). 
 151. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 528–29 (1989) (explaining that 
court was determining if damages awarded for publishing private facts were 
appropriate). 
 152. See id. (discussing whether a local newspaper disclosing a rape victim’s 
name after receiving if from the police constitutes as a misdemeanor). 
 153. See id. at 527 (explaining that the police report containing the victim’s 
name was left in the pressroom and that the department put no restrictions on 
who could enter the pressroom). 
 154. See id. (describing the chain of events that resulted in the publication of 
the victim’s name). 
 155. See id. at 528–29 (explaining that the trial court denied defendant’s 
motion for a directed verdict and allowed the jury to award $75,000 in 
compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages). 
 156. See id. at 541 (holding that a statute cannot impose punishment on a 
newspaper for publishing the legally obtained truthful facts unless the statute is 
narrowly tailored to serve a state interest of the “highest order”). 
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test from Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co.,157 which stated “[I]f a 
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of 
public significance then state officials may not constitutionally 
punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a 
state interest of the highest order.”158 The Court stressed the fear 
that imposing liability in cases such as this would lead to “timidity 
and self-censorship” within the press itself.159 The Court explained 
that while protection of rape victims’ identity was a “highly 
significant” interest, the means applied were not narrowly tailored 
to effectuate their goal.160 While the Court was examining a 
negligence per se action based on a criminal statute here, it did 
take the opportunity to discuss briefly some implications of the 
publication of private facts tort.161 The Court noted that the 
negligence per se claim brought here had a very low threshold for 
imposing civil sanctions.162 This observation seemed to trouble the 
Court, which stated “there [is no] scienter requirement of any kind 
under § 794.03, engendering the perverse result that truthful 
publications challenged pursuant to this cause of action are less 
protected by the First Amendment than even the least protected 
defamatory falsehoods.”163 This disturbing observation could also 
directly apply to the publication of private facts tort, where there 
similarly is no scienter, actual malice, or bad faith requirement to 
impose liability, making truthful speech less protected than 
defamation.164 
                                                                                                     
 157. See Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1979) (holding 
narrowly that the asserted state interest could not justify the statute’s imposition 
of criminal sanctions on the truthful publication of an alleged juvenile 
delinquent’s name lawfully obtained by the newspaper). 
 158. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989). 
 159. See id. at 535–36 (explaining that a justification for Daily Mail’s test is 
the potential chilling effect of the punishment of legally obtained truthful facts 
would create). 
 160. See id. at 537 (indicating that the interest did not create a “need” to 
impose liability and thereby infringe upon the First Amendment). 
 161. See id. at 539 (discussing the differences between this claim and one that 
would be brought under publication of private facts). 
 162. See id. (explaining that under the negligence per se standard employed 
by the lower courts, punishment was imposed simply for publishing the name 
without any other requirements). 
 163. Id.  
 164. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (providing the definition 
and elements of the publication of private facts tort). 
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As the newsworthy exception became further cemented into 
the common law, its definition would continue to evolve. In 
Alabama, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
employed a nexus test to determine if the revealed private fact had 
a valid connection with the public interest served by its 
revelation.165 The Fifth Circuit court heard a case based on the 
publication of private details about the marriage between the 
plaintiff and the author’s brother.166 The court applied the fairly 
recent decision by the Supreme Court and held that the disclosure 
here was protected by the newsworthy exception.167 In doing so the 
appellate court gave some bounds to the qualification for the 
newsworthiness privilege derived from the First Amendment, 
stating: 
[The] privilege is not merely limited to the dissemination of 
news either in the sense of current events or commentary upon 
public affairs. Rather, the privilege extends to information 
concerning interesting phases of human activity and embraces 
all issues about which information is needed or appropriate so 
that individuals may cope with the exigencies of their period.168 
The Fifth Circuit provided a rather expansive view of the scope of 
the privilege and its resulting newsworthy exception, explaining 
that newsworthiness can apply to almost anything of public 
interest.169 The court explained that once that public interest 
element has been recognized, a logical nexus between the 
publicized facts and the matter of public interest must be 
established to avoid liability.170 The court quickly disposed of the 
                                                                                                     
 165. See Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(explaining that a logical nexus existed between the facts complained and the 
public interest that the book in question promoted). 
 166. See id. at 396–97 (describing the nature of the claim brought, which was 
based on the publication of facts concerning the author’s brother and how he 
influenced the religious and civil rights beliefs of the author). 
 167. See id. at 397 (discussing that a First Amendment privilege exists, that 
it applies to the tort of invasion of privacy, and that it protects the speech in 
question). 
 168. Id. 
 169. See id. (indicating that the privilege is adaptable and may be used to 
combat intrusions on the First Amendment as they are encountered). 
 170. See id. (articulating that requiring a logical nexus protects the privacy of 
those whose actions may be of public interest, but are not logically related to the 
public interest promoted by the revelation of those details). 
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nexus issue, explaining that the effects of the plaintiff’s 
relationship with the author’s brother or the author were clearly 
appropriate to be published in a book about the author’s life.171 
In 1969 the California Supreme Court again was presented 
with an invasion of privacy by publication of true facts claim, this 
time with a voluntary public figure in Kapellas v. Kofman.172 The 
plaintiff, a candidate for city council, brought a claim for invasion 
of privacy against a newspaper after an article was published 
featuring unflattering facts about her qualifications for city council 
and her children.173 The Supreme Court of California affirmed the 
dismissal of the invasion of privacy claim because of how important 
it was that the press disseminate of information about political 
candidates.174 In doing so, the court distinguished between 
voluntary and involuntary public figures, stating: 
In determining whether a particular incident is “newsworthy” 
and thus whether the privilege shields its truthful publication 
from liability, the courts consider a variety of factors, including 
the social value of the facts published, the depth of the article’s 
intrusion into ostensibly private affairs, and the extent to which 
the party voluntarily acceded to a position of public 
notoriety . . . . [W]hen the legitimate public interest in the 
published information is substantial, a much greater intrusion 
into an individual’s private life will be sanctioned, especially if 
the individual willingly entered into the public sphere.175 
Here we have an apparent divergence in standards for plaintiffs, 
those that are voluntary public figures and those that are 
involuntary.176 This distinction is well within the tradition of torts 
that potentially encroach on the First Amendment, where libel, 
                                                                                                     
 171. See id. (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that a logical nexus did not 
exist between the publicized facts and the public interest served by their 
publication). 
 172.  See Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 914 (Cal. 1969) (explaining that 
the plaintiff, a politician running for office, had brought the claim for invasion of 
privacy on behalf of both herself and her children). 
 173. See id. (indicating that the claim was brought as a result of facts stated 
about both the plaintiff’s qualifications for city council and her children). 
 174. See id. at 924 (affirming the dismissal of the invasion of privacy claim 
because of the categorical importance of the information conveyed). 
 175. Id. at 922. 
 176. See id. (indicating that the court would allow greater intrusions into the 
privacy of voluntary public figures). 
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slander, and defamation law all hold similar standards.177 As we 
will see in the next case, involuntary public figures have a similar 
difficulties in claims for invasion of privacy claim as the 
newsworthiness exception has been read very broadly to 
encompass almost any publication of facts the public would find 
interesting. 
In 1984, the California Court of Appeals applied the 
newsworthy exception to a case involving an involuntary public 
figure.178 That court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
definition for an involuntary public figure and their corresponding 
privacy rights.179 The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines an 
involuntary public figure as: 
There are other individuals who have not sought publicity or 
consented to it, but through their own conduct or otherwise 
have become a legitimate subject of public interest. They have, 
in other words, become ‘news.’ Those who commit crime or are 
accused of it may not only not seek publicity but may make 
every possible effort to avoid it, but they are nevertheless 
persons of public interest, concerning whom the public is 
entitled to be informed. The same is true as to those who are the 
victims of crime or are so unfortunate as to be present when it 
is committed, as well as those who are the victims of 
catastrophes or accidents or are involved in judicial proceedings 
or other events that attract public attention. These persons are 
regarded as properly subject to the public interest, and 
publishers are permitted to satisfy the curiosity of the public as 
to its heroes, leaders, villains and victims, and those who are 
closely associated with them. As in the case of the voluntary 
public figure, the authorized publicity is not limited to the event 
that itself arouses the public interest, and to some reasonable 
extent includes publicity given to facts about the individual that 
would otherwise be purely private.180 
                                                                                                     
 177. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268 (1964) (distinguishing 
between the remedies of a public official and a private person in a civil libel 
action); see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 49–50 (1988) 
(differentiating between the pleading standard required for a public figure and a 
private figure in an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim). 
 178. See Sipple v. Chron. Pub. Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 666 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) 
(explaining the involuntary nature of the plaintiff’s status as a public figure). 
 179. See id. (discussing that the court is employing the definition from the 
Restatement to determine if the plaintiff is now a voluntary public figure). 
 180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. f. 
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In Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Company,181 the California Court 
of Appeals heard a claim from a gay man who had helped avert an 
assassination attempt on President Gerald Ford in 1975.182 An 
article was then written about Oliver W. Sipple (Sipple) that 
revealed his sexual orientation and he brought this claim following 
its publication.183 The court ruled that no invasion of privacy had 
occurred because knowledge of Sipple’s sexual orientation was 
known by several hundred people.184 The court went on to suggest 
that even if his sexual orientation had been a closely-guarded 
secret, his claim would have still failed because the information 
was newsworthy.185 The court explained that the motivation for 
the publication of the document can be helpful to the 
determination of whether the newsworthy exception applies.186 
The court again quoted the Restatement (Second) of Torts: 
The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving 
of information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a 
morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, 
with which a reasonable member of the public, with decent 
standards, would say that he had no concern.187 
As one can see, the contours and boundaries of the newsworthy 
exception have begun to be drawn. Not only is the newsworthy 
value of the news being used as a factor, but also the motivation 
that surrounds the release of that information. The information 
                                                                                                     
 181. See Sipple, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 671 (affirming summary judgment because 
the “trial court could determine as a matter of law that the facts contained in the 
articles were not private facts within the purview of the law and also that the 
publications relative to the appellant were newsworthy”). 
 182. See id. at 666 (explaining the facts of the case, that Sipple pushed the 
arm of Ford’s would be assassin as she raised and shot a gun at the President). 
 183. See id. at 670 n.2 (indicating that the article revealed that Sipple was 
gay, with the hope that perhaps this revelation would help break traditional 
homosexual stereotypes). 
 184. See id. (discussing that the large number of individuals in multiple cities 
with knowledge of the plaintiff’s sexual orientation precluded a suit because the 
facts were not private). 
 185. See id. at 669 (articulating that even if the plaintiff’s sexual orientation 
was not known by the public the publication of the fact would have been protected 
by the newsworthy exception). 
 186. See id. at 668 (explaining that because the publications motives were not 
in bad faith and the information was newsworthy, the plaintiff’s claim was not 
valid). 
 187. Id. at 670 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h. 
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alone, being of interest to the general public, is not the only factor 
to be considered, but also whether the release of the private 
information directly serves the public interest purpose proffered 
for its dissemination. 
When Delaware first encountered a claim for invasion of 
privacy due to publication of private facts in 1963, it reached a 
familiar result.188 This case concerned an article written following 
a state senator’s proposed bill reinstating whipping as a 
punishment for certain crimes.189 The article mentioned that the 
last time that punishment was administered was eleven years 
earlier to a John Barbieri for breaking and entering.190 The 
Delaware court employed a similar reasoning to that in Sipple, 
explaining that one who has become a public figure has lost certain 
privacy rights.191 The court aptly stated “One who seeks the public 
eye cannot complain of publicity if the publication does not violate 
ordinary notions of decency.”192 Because Senator Barbieri had been 
thrust into the public eye due to his criminal conviction, he was a 
public figure for the purposes of his claim.193 
The Supreme Court of Kansas used similar reasoning when it 
examined a claim that a newspaper publishing alleged private 
facts in 1975.194 In the case, a former police officer’s dismissal was 
publicized in a paper’s column that focused on events that took 
place ten years earlier to the day in the town.195 The Kansas court 
                                                                                                     
 188. See Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 189 A.2d 773 (Del. 1963) (stating that 
this is the first time an invasion of privacy claim of this type has been brought in 
Delaware). 
 189. See id. at 773–74 (discussing that the article was written following and 
in response to a state senator’s proposal to reinstate whipping as a punishment). 
 190. See id. (describing that in the course of the article, Barbieri was 
mentioned because he was the last recorded person officially punished by 
whipping in Delaware). 
 191. See id. at 774–75 (indicating that the actions of public figures are of 
public interest and should be able to be reported upon). 
 192. Id. at 774. 
 193. See id. at 774–75 (explaining that like other types of public figures, 
criminals were public figures for the purposes of their trial and punishment); but 
see Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 168–69 (1979) (holding 
that a contempt citation did not make a plaintiff a public figure when bringing a 
libel claim). 
 194. See Rawlins v. Hutchinson Pub. Co., 543 P.2d 988, 989 (Kan. 1975) 
(explaining that this is a publication of private facts claim against a newspaper). 
 195. See id. at 989–90 (explaining the nature of the article that publicized the 
HOGAN V.GAWKER: A LEG DROP 243 
ruled that because of his status as a police officer, he was a public 
official and, as a result, his actions were of public interest.196 As 
the Kansas court stated “[a] person who by his accomplishments, 
fame, or mode of life, or by adopting a profession or calling which 
gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, affairs, or 
character, is said to become a public personage, and thereby 
relinquishes a part of his right of privacy.”197 Much like the earlier 
courts discussed, it is clear the Kansas court intends to create a 
separate standard for invasions of privacy for purely private 
individuals versus public figures and officials. As we will see, this 
distinction has very real consequences for plaintiffs, with the fate 
of their claim based largely on their status. 
So far, these cases have concerned specific newsworthy events 
or actions. In 1980, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit encountered a case where facts tangentially related 
to a newsworthy event were published and the subject of the story 
brought a claim for publication of private facts.198 The case 
concerned an article written about an anesthesiologist who was the 
subject of two malpractice suits.199 The article sought to highlight 
the issue presented by improper medical policing that could result 
in severe injury or death.200 The plaintiff alleged that the article 
violated her privacy rights by discussing her history of “psychiatric 
and related personal problems,” arguing that her problems 
themselves were not newsworthy.201 The Tenth Circuit concluded 
that the reported private facts were newsworthy because there an 
                                                                                                     
unflattering facts about the officer’s dismissal ten years earlier). 
 196. See id. at 993 (indicating that both public figures and public officials give 
up certain privacy rights that would be afforded to other citizens). 
 197. Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting Cohen v. Marx, 211 P.2d 320, 
321 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949)). 
 198. See Gilbert v. Med. Econ. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1981) 
(explaining the premise of a plaintiff’s argument that the information printed, 
while related to her, had no relation to the newsworthy event that was being 
covered). 
 199. See id. at 306 (specifying that both episodes of malpractice resulted in 
either death or extreme disability to the patient). 
 200. See id. at 306–07 (describing the article’s motivation for highlighting an 
issue within the professional community of doctors). 
 201. See id. (indicating that the “problems” were included in the story as an 
explanation for the plaintiff’s erratic and tortious behavior). 
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editor could draw a “rational inference” between the facts and the 
newsworthy event.202 The court reasons: 
[T]hat a rule forbidding editors from drawing inferences from 
truthful newsworthy facts would result in a far too restrictive 
and wholly unjustifiable construction of the first amendment 
privilege. If the press is to have the generous breathing space 
that courts have accorded it thus far, editors must have freedom 
to make reasonable judgments and to draw one inference where 
others also reasonably could be drawn. This is precisely the 
editorial discretion contemplated by the privilege.203 
If a reasonable editor could draw an inference between the private 
fact and the newsworthy event, then the publication would face no 
liability.204 The reasonable editor standard for finding inferences 
should have protected Gawker from liability because a reasonable 
inference can be drawn between the sex tape and the newsworthy 
topic of Bollea’s reputation as a role model for children. The 
adultery serves to directly oppose the supposition that Bollea was 
fit to be a role model and therefore it is newsworthy. 
In the early 1990s the magniloquent Judge Posner and the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit weighed in 
on an invasion of privacy claim brought over the tangential subject 
of a book.205 The case involved both a libel and an invasion of 
privacy claim, both based on the contents of a book depicting the 
African-American transition that occurred during the Great 
Migration.206 The book attempted to encapsulate the unique 
African-American experience that was present during the Great 
Migration.207 The author, Nicholas Lemann, attempted to do this 
                                                                                                     
 202. See id. at 308–09 (explaining that because an editor could infer that these 
private facts were related to the newsworthy event, a recovery was barred). 
 203. Id. at 309. 
 204. See id. (concluding that editorial discretion requires a reasonable editor 
to make inferences between private facts and newsworthy events that others 
potentially would not). 
 205. See Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1224 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(explaining the nature of the claims and that they followed from publication of a 
book featuring the plaintiff and his wife). 
 206. See id. (stating that the plaintiff sought relief for both libelous 
statements made in the book about him and for an invasion of his privacy by 
publicizing unflattering facts about him). 
 207. See id. (discussing that the Great Migration was a movement of five 
million African-Americans between 1940 and 1970 from rural areas in the South 
to more urban areas in the North). 
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by following of the story of several individuals whose experience 
was representative of the many.208 These details were important 
because they formed the basis of Judge Posner’s reasoning for the 
required nexus between the private facts and the social interest 
served by their publication.209 Judge Posner’s analysis began with 
a reading of the earlier precedent, leading him to draw the 
conclusion that “[t]he Court must believe that the First 
Amendment greatly circumscribes the right even of a private 
figure to obtain damages for the publication of newsworthy facts 
about him, even when they are facts of a kind that people want 
very much to conceal.”210 Posner recognized and read the tort to be 
valid only if “the private facts publicized be such as would make a 
reasonable person deeply offended by such publicity but also that 
they be facts in which the public has no legitimate interest.”211 
Posner then applied his reasoning of the tort to the case and found 
that there is a connection between the private facts and the public 
interest served.212 The facts are inseparable from the book if it is 
to perform the vital social function for which it was written: inform 
readers about The Great Migration.213  
This interpretation implies a rather liberal nexus test, that 
the private facts publicized only need to have a tangential, albeit 
necessary, relation to public interest served. But Posner left us 
with a caveat that proves somewhat fortuitous “[p]hotographic 
invasions of privacy usually are more painful than narrative ones, 
and even partial nudity is a considerable aggravating factor.”214 
                                                                                                     
 208. See id. (discussing the journalistic method that Lemann used in his 
narrative, attempting to tell the story of the whole by telling the story of 
representative individuals). 
 209. See id. at 1233 (reasoning that because the events of the lives represent 
the subject matter of the book, it was necessary for the author to include the 
accounts, lest his work of journalism become one of fiction, frustrating the societal 
benefit of his work in the first place). 
 210. Id. at 1232. 
 211. Id. 
 212. See id. (explaining that the methodology used for writing the book, that 
of individual case studies, required that the author publish the stories about its 
subject). 
 213. See id. (indicating that because specific facts were necessary to the 
publication of the book, the publication served to establish a connection to public 
interest). 
 214. Id. at 1234. 
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Posner indicated that the medium of the publication makes a 
difference in the balancing of public interest and the private 
interest.215 The medium of publication of many of these private 
facts changed to that of the new media over several years following 
Haynes.216 However, the results for plaintiffs and the 
corresponding freedoms enjoyed by the press to publicize truthful 
facts would not change. 
B. A Shift from Old Media to New and Its Effect on the Tort 
So far, the invasions of privacy claims examined have 
primarily taken the form of the written word. The statements the 
plaintiffs complained of were found in newspapers or other written 
publications.217 As the primary mode of media shifted over the late 
twentieth century, 218 so did the medium that transmitted many of 
these complained invasions of privacy.219 Media transitioned from 
the written word to broadcast video, and a whole new line of issues 
and, eventually, cases evolved with it. Still, the precedent 
remained familiar, and the courts still set an incredibly high bar 
for plaintiffs seeking to recover from the media for publication of 
private facts. 
The new media reared its ugly head in the publication of 
private facts realm repeatedly during the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries. In 1998, the Supreme Court of California 
                                                                                                     
 215. See id. at 1224 (explaining that photographic intrusions are more painful 
than others and therefore through extrapolation one can assume that private 
facts published in the form other than the written word may have different 
balancing weights associated with the factors). 
 216. See Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 473 (Cal. 1998) 
(acknowledging that the shift from print media to electronic media has become 
substantial).  
 217. See generally Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940). 
 218. See GEOFFREY COLON, DISRUPTIVE MARKETING: WHAT GROWTH HACKERS, 
DATA PUNKS AND OTHER HYBRID THINKERS CAN TEACH US ABOUT NAVIGATING THE 
NEW NORMAL 239 (2016) (“It wasn’t until the early 20th century that we had our 
senses of sound a sight awoken by radio, television, and the birth of broadcast 
media. This new media shift had an easy-to-understand dynamic.”). 
 219. See supra Section B (explaining that this author observed the cases that 
began to emerge in the 1990s tended to be from the publication of private facts 
over video media rather than print media). 
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again approached the publication of private facts question.220 The 
court was keenly aware of the shift in media coverage and the 
effects the shift may have on the tort.221 The change in the primary 
medium of media could potentially create even more offensive 
invasions into one’s private life. However, squaring that risk with 
the fundamental right of the press to report on truthful facts 
became an even more difficult balancing act than that in which the 
courts had been previously engaged.222 The Supreme Court of 
California eloquently stated the difficulty here: 
At what point does the publishing or broadcasting of otherwise 
private words, expressions and emotions cease to be protected 
by the press’s constitutional and common law privilege—its 
right to report on matters of legitimate public interest—and 
become an unjustified, actionable invasion of the subject’s 
private life? How can the courts fashion and administer 
meaningful rules for protecting privacy without 
unconstitutionally setting themselves up as censors or editors? 
Publication or broadcast aside, do reporters, in their effort to 
gather the news, have any special privilege to intrude, 
physically or with sophisticated photographic and recording 
equipment, into places and conversations that would otherwise 
be private? Questions of this nature have concerned courts and 
commentators at least since Brandeis and Warren wrote their 
seminal article, and continue to do so to this day.223 
Therein lies the difficulty the courts have with this issue. 
Individuals value privacy greatly, but a well-functioning 
democracy requires freedom of the press to report on factual, 
newsworthy events.224 The facts the Supreme Court of California 
considered are enough to make anyone sympathetic to the plight 
                                                                                                     
 220. See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 473 (discussing the nature of invasion of 
privacy claims brought for a publication of private facts). 
 221. See id. (expressing that the problems associated with defining a right of 
privacy have not changed, even though the medium has, and that the new 
medium may bring new problems that were not clear or developed during the 
written word period of the tort). 
 222. See id. (indicating that the balancing of privacy rights and the freedom 
of the press to report truthful, newsworthy facts created a very difficult balancing 
act for the courts to employ). 
 223. Id. at 473–74. 
 224. See id. (specifying the difficult position courts found themselves in 
regarding the balancing of privacy rights of individuals with the press’s right to 
report on truthful matters of public interest). 
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of those whose privacy is limited by their involvement in an event 
of public interest. The plaintiff, Ruth Shulman (Shulman), was 
involved in a terrible car accident.225 After the accident, a medical 
helicopter containing a camera man employed by the defendants 
was dispatched to provide medical care and transport Shulman to 
the hospital.226 Shulman’s ordeal was filmed and then broadcast 
several months later.227 Shulman then brought a claim for invasion 
of privacy due to publication of the video.228 The court, in 
recognizing the difficult balancing act they were required to 
perform, read the tort to require that the published information 
not be newsworthy.229 Also, the court recognized that 
“newsworthiness is at the same time a constitutional defense to, or 
privilege against, liability for publication of truthful 
information.”230 Then the court analyzed what constituted a 
matter of public interest based on precedent.231 The court made a 
“normative assessment” of the “social value” of the content while 
factoring in both the “degree of intrusion” into the plaintiff’s 
privacy and the plaintiff’s own contribution to being a part of the 
public event.232 The court concluded that “recent decisions have 
generally tested newsworthiness with regard to such individuals 
by assessing the logical relationship or nexus, or the lack thereof, 
between the events or activities that brought the person into the 
public eye and the particular facts disclosed.”233 A nexus test is 
necessary to determine if the newsworthy event is logically related 
                                                                                                     
 225. See id. at 475 (describing how the plaintiff’s car was found in a ditch and 
that the jaws of life were employed to extract the occupants of the car). 
 226. See id. (explaining that the within the helicopter was a cameraman and 
nurse who had was wearing a microphone). 
 227. See id. at 474–76 (stating that the events following the accident were 
broadcast in a show entitled “On Scene: Emergency Response” shortly after the 
accident). 
 228. See id. at 476 (articulating how the plaintiffs brought claims against the 
producers of the show for invasion of privacy). 
 229.  See id. at 478–79 (discussing that earlier precedent in California had 
recognized lack of newsworthiness as an element of the prima facie case for 
invasion of privacy by publication of private facts). 
 230. Id. at 479. 
 231. See id. at 479–84 (listing the different effects on precedent of the tort 
over the years to help define what qualifies as newsworthy). 
 232. See id. (stating the balancing test the courts must employ to determine 
whether the facts at issue are newsworthy). 
 233. Id. at 484–85. 
HOGAN V.GAWKER: A LEG DROP 249 
to the facts disclosed.234 Requiring a nexus draws “a protective line 
at the point the material revealed ceases to have any substantial 
connection to the subject matter of the newsworthy report.”235 The 
court cautioned that great deference must be given to the press, 
that it is not the job of the courts or juries to determine what is fit 
to publish, and that the standard for newsworthiness is whether 
“some reasonable members of the community could entertain a 
legitimate interest in it.”236 The court restrained its balancing of 
interests to the newsworthiness element.237 After its analysis, the 
court determined that the events Shulman experienced were of 
public interest and her claim was precluded by that status.238 The 
court concluded with warnings over the potential First 
Amendment issues brought forth by cases such as these, stating: 
That analytical path is dictated by the danger of the contrary 
approach; to allow liability because this court, or a jury, believes 
certain details of the story as broadcast were not important or 
necessary to the purpose of the documentary, or were in poor 
taste or overly sensational in impact, would be to assert 
impermissible supervisory power over the press . . . . In short, 
the state may not intrude into the proper sphere of the news 
media to dictate what they should publish and broadcast, but 
neither may the media play tyrant to the people by unlawfully 
spying on them in the name of newsgathering.239 
These are reoccurring themes present throughout a study of the 
precedent: the balancing of the First Amendment interest and the 
individual right to privacy. As more media moved to video and 
away from the written word, more cases of this ilk were presented 
to courts around the country with similar results. 
Later in 1998, the Central District of California was presented 
with a case very similar to Bollea v. Gawker, in Michael v. Internet 
                                                                                                     
 234. See id. at 484 (discussing that a “logical nexus” is required for the 
newsworthiness exception to apply). 
 235. Id. 
 236. See id. at 485–86 (describing the difficulties in applying newsworthy 
standard due to differing opinions between individuals about what constitutes as 
general public interest). 
 237. See id. at 487 (explaining that, in order to determine if certain facts 
published are newsworthy, a balancing of interests must be employed). 
 238. See id. (articulating that the court agrees that the events broadcasted 
were of a legitimate public interest and therefore the suit fails). 
 239. Id. at 497–98. 
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Entertainment Group, Inc.240 Celebrities Bret Michaels and 
Pamela Anderson Lee had made a sex tape together that was 
acquired by Internet Entertainment Group (IEG) who planned to 
sell it on the internet.241 This announcement by IEG created 
intense media attention and speculation because of the status of 
the celebrities, and because Pamela Anderson had been involved 
in a similar dispute some years earlier.242 At this point the court 
was determining whether to grant summary judgment to the 
secondary defendant Paramount, the producers of the show “Hard 
Copy.”243 Paramount had broadcast several short segments of the 
sex tape, each lasting between two and five seconds, in an episode 
of Hard Copy.244 The court ruled that the facts at issue in this case 
were private, but the claim was barred by the newsworthiness 
privilege.245 It justified its summary judgment by determining that 
“in cases balancing First Amendment against state law right to 
privacy, federal courts should resolve doubtful cases at summary 
judgment to prevent freedom of the press from being restricted ‘at 
the sufferance of juries.’”246 The court ruled that the newsworthy 
privilege applied because Anderson was a voluntary public figure 
and the “private matters bore a substantial nexus to a matter of 
public interest.”247 Because of Anderson’s status as a voluntary 
public figure, the court questioned whether the nexus was 
                                                                                                     
 240. See Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., Inc., No. CV 98–0583 DDP (CWx), 
1998 WL 882848, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 1998) (granting summary judgment 
for defendants in a publication of private facts because showing short clips of a 
celebrity sex tape constituted newsworthy content). 
 241. See id. (stating that the sex tape had been made and then, through 
circumstances not entirely known, acquired by IEG who planned to market and 
sell the video through their websites). 
 242. See id. at *8 (indicating that the case had brought media attention, and 
briefly discussing Pamela Anderson’s similar sex-tape litigation from the 
preceding year). 
 243. See id. at *1 (stating that the court was considering a summary judgment 
motion for the alleged invasion of privacy committed by Paramount, not the 
invasion of privacy committed by Internet Entertainment Group). 
 244. See id. (discussing that portions of the video were broadcast on Hard 
Copy, and that each one of those portions was between two and five seconds). 
 245. See id. at *9 (concluding that although the facts were considered private, 
the newsworthiness privilege applied and that summary judgment was 
appropriate). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at *10. 
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required. 248 The court ultimately felt that the nexus would be 
satisfied even if unnecessary.249 The court balanced the intrusion 
with the public interest, noting that courts must give great 
deference to the public interest in these matters.250 The court then 
ruled that the tort will fail as a matter of law, and granted 
Paramount summary judgment on the invasion of privacy claim.251 
Pamela Anderson was in the California courtrooms one year 
prior to the Michaels litigation, bringing an invasion of privacy 
claim against the publishers of “Penthouse Magazine” for 
publishing intimate pictures of both her and her now ex-husband, 
Tommy Lee.252 In granting the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment, the United States Court for the Central District of 
California made two key observations. First, the court stated that 
the “intimate nature of the photographs and the degree to which 
their publication intruded upon the privacy of Plaintiffs is simply 
not relevant for determining newsworthiness.”253 The court 
essentially determined that the offensive nature of a picture or 
video published did not detract from its newsworthiness. The 
second key observation was that if a photo has already been 
published, it no longer qualifies as a private fact for the purposes 
of an invasion of privacy suit.254 The court concluded that once the 
first actor has broken the seal of privacy by releasing a photo, 
actors who later release the photo are not liable for invading the 
privacy of the subject of those photos. These two points made by 
                                                                                                     
 248. See id. at *9 (“Because Lee is a voluntary public figure, it is not clear 
whether the Shulman requirement of a substantial nexus between the matters 
published and reasons for her notoriety is necessary.”). 
 249. See id. at *10 (discussing that the court was not sure whether to require 
the nexus to show if matter is newsworthy in the case of voluntary public figures, 
but if it was found necessary, that the element would be satisfied by the facts of 
this case). 
 250. See id. (explaining that even once newsworthiness is established, a 
balancing of the public and private interest is still necessary). 
 251. See id. (concluding that summary judgment was appropriate because the 
newsworthiness privilege applied). 
 252. See Lee v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., No. CV96–7069SVW (JGX), 1997 WL 
33384309, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 1997) (dissecting the nature of the claim, that 
the photos published were of an “intimate” nature, and were featured in an article 
describing Anderson’s life and marriage to Tommy Lee). 
 253. Id. at *5. 
 254. See id. at *6 (describing that once a photo has been published, it is now 
in the public realm and no longer considered a private fact). 
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the court in this matter are essential to the analysis of the Bollea 
decision, and both serve to invalidate the claim against Gawker. 
California is not the only state to encounter a claim brought 
for invasion of privacy through the broadcast of images. In 1997, a 
man whose arrest was filmed and broadcasted on the television 
show “COPS” brought a claim in Ohio against Fox Television 
Network.255 The United States Court for the Northern District of 
Ohio granted summary judgment to the defendants, determining 
that the facts broadcasts were newsworthy because they related to 
matter of legitimate public concern.256 
The common theme throughout these cases is the protection of 
journalists’ rights to print legally obtained factual information 
without facing civil liability. Once the potential for civil liability 
enters the editor’s mental calculus, their editorial discretion has 
been chilled in a way completely incompatible with our conception 
of First Amendment rights.257 The right to print truthful facts 
relating to a newsworthy topic is essential to maintain the delicate 
market place of ideas that our country relies upon. This is 
especially true when those facts relate to a newsworthy event 
involving a public figure or official. The press plays a special role 
in providing oversight for the public, requiring that public figures 
and officials, who have benefitted so much from the public itself, 
be held to the same standard in their private lives as they claim to 
hold themselves to in their public lives.  
V. Application of Precedent to Bollea v. Gawker 
After looking at the history of publication of private facts 
cases, it is clear that precedent would point towards no liability for 
Gawker for two primary reasons: Bollea is a public figure and the 
publication of the tape is related to a newsworthy issue. These two 
factors are invariably intertwined. 
                                                                                                     
 255. See Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F. Supp. 703, 707 (N.D. Ohio 
1997) (explaining the background of the case, that the claim arises from a filmed 
arrest following a physical altercation). 
 256. See id. at 709 (stating the claim fails because the arrest of individuals is 
a matter of public interest). 
 257. See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974) 
(discussing that penalties for printing controversial material may result in editors 
avoiding printing controversial material completely). 
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Gawker should have faced no liability because the tape at 
issue related to a newsworthy event. Bollea is a public figure 
because of his celebrity.258 He has been personally enriched 
because of this celebrity, and much of that celebrity is based on the 
public perception that he is the All-American hero he was 
portrayed to be in wrestling.259 Bollea’s image as Hulk Hogan was 
so entrenched in popular culture that even after a long “heel run” 
the fans cheered and longed for the hero Hogan character to 
return.260 One such example of this occurred in Toronto at 
WrestleMania 18.261 Bollea had recently returned to the WWE, 
playing the dastardly heel character “Hollywood” Hulk Hogan.262 
He was programmed with Dwayne “The Rock” Johnson, a babyface 
who was arguably the most popular wrestler at the time.263 In 
order to set up the match, and portray Bollea in the most negative 
light possible, Bollea repeatedly attacked Johnson along with his 
gang and even spray painted Bollea’s group logo on his back.264 
Following these events, the natural reaction of most audiences 
would be to “boo” Bollea. When Bollea made his entrance, the 
arena erupted—it was clear that plans had to changed.265 The fans 
simply refused to treat Bollea as a heel; he simply meant that 
                                                                                                     
 258. See Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2014) (explaining that it was undisputed that Terry Bollea was a public 
figure). 
 259. See Madigan, supra note 15 (“Describing the former wrestler as ‘a real 
American hero’ and, when he was younger, ‘the ultimate object of desire.’”). 
 260. See Episode 30: The NWO in WWE, SOMETHING TO WRESTLE WITH BRUCE 
PRICHARD (Feb. 3, 2017) (downloaded through iTunes) (describing that Bollea had 
been portrayed as a heel since he joined the NWO in 1996). 
 261. See id. (indicating that WrestleMania 18 was Bollea’s first WrestleMania 
appearance since 1993). 
 262. See id. (stating that when Bollea rejoined the WWE he was portraying 
the Hollywood Hogan character that he had developed while in the faction 
“NWO”). 
 263. See id. (specifying that Johnson may have been the most popular 
wrestler in the world). 
 264. See id. (describing that in order to ensure that fans would boo Bollea, 
Bollea and his two “NWO” companions—Scott Hall and Kevin Nash—would 
repeatedly attempt to injure Johnson in the weeks leading up to the match, 
including by ramming a semi-truck into an ambulance purportedly carrying an 
injured Johnson).  
 265. See id. (explaining that fans, despite the company’s best efforts, still 
viewed Bollea as a hero). 
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much to the audience.266 Bollea’s good guy image was so engrained 
in popular and wrestling culture that audiences would simply not 
accept him as a villain.267 Therefore, it would be reasonable that 
any information directly refuting the purported good guy image of 
Bollea would be newsworthy.  
Given Bollea’s reputation as a role model for children, 
information directly proving his engagement in adultery would 
serve to disprove this reputation, or at least to couch it in realistic 
terms. It is important that society view its role models realistically. 
Knowing whether our role models’ private actions comport with 
their public images serves as a societal check. Society deserves to 
know if public figures are the people they say are. Because the tape 
went to directly disprove, or at least throw doubt on whether Bollea 
was the man he publically purported to be, it is newsworthy. 
Hogan was not forced to become a role model. He voluntarily took 
on the moniker and has received countless benefits from it.268 
Because of this the public has a right to know if his character is 
worthy of the illustrious position he has been raised to in the public 
eye. 
The tape itself is also newsworthy. Much like in Michaels, the 
public was aware that this tape existed and considerable curiosity 
had developed around it.269 That public interest in the tape, about 
its existence and content, in and of itself makes it newsworthy.270 
                                                                                                     
 266. See id. (indicating that because of the great nostalgia many fans hold 
towards Bollea it was impossible for the fans to boo him). 
 267. See id. (stating that many fans still looked at Bollea as their idol). 
 268. See Nick Schwartz, WCW Salaries Between 1996 and 2000 Revealed, 
with Hulk Hogan and Dennis Rodman Big Winners, FOX SPORTS (June 7, 2016, 
6:46 PM), https://www.foxsports.com.au/what-the-fox/wcw-salaries-between-
1996-and-2000-revealed-with-hulk-hogan-and-dennis-rodman-big-winners/news-story/ 
cc0dd40421817640c1399f47a2224b89 (explaining that while working for WCW 
Bollea’s salary was $5 million greater than the next highest salary) (on file with 
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 269. See Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2014) (indicating that numerous publications had already reported the 
existence of the video, generating public interest and curiosity about its 
existence). 
 270. See Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., Inc., No. CV 98–0583 DDP (CWx), 
1998 WL 882848, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 1998) (explaining that public interest 
in the existence of the tape and its creation were sufficient to make the event 
newsworthy). 
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Public knowledge of the tape creates widespread curiosity.271 
When that curiosity is then reasonably related to a matter of a 
public concern to the extent that a reasonable editor could draw an 
inference that the private fact related to the public concern, both a 
nexus and newsworthiness is established.272 In our current case, 
that newsworthy event linked to the private facts could either be 
its refutation of Bollea’s status as a role model, or the release of 
the video itself.273 A reasonable editor could draw an inference 
from the tape to either of those two subjects, both being 
newsworthy and capable of preventing liability. 
VI. Recommendations 
To combat the problems that juries present with these 
sensitive matters, I recommend that the court apply a similar 
summary judgment standard for invasion of privacy by publication 
of private facts to that laid out by Judge Dean Pregerson in 
Michaels.274 If the plaintiff can establish that the facts reported 
were not newsworthy, then the summary judgment should not be 
granted.275 When that is not established, it is appropriate to grant 
summary judgment to the defendant.276 In order to protect 
defendants from sensitive juries, unable to separate themselves 
from these public events, it would be appropriate in my estimation 
to require that the facts in contest be shown to be non-newsworthy 
before allowing the trial to continue. The question of 
newsworthiness is a factual determination, but one that is too 
                                                                                                     
 271. See id. (indicating that uncertainty surrounding the existence or release 
of a tape of this kind creates public interest and a newsworthy story). 
 272. See Gilbert v. Med. Econ. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308–09 (10th Cir. 1981) 
(describing that a publication cannot be held liable for revealing legally obtained 
private facts that a reasonable editor could draw in inference from relating it to 
the newsworthy event). 
 273. See Michaels, 1998 WL 882848, at *10 (discussing the curiosity 
surrounding the tape’s release created a newsworthy event). 
 274. See id. (indicating that once a substantial nexus is established to a 
newsworthy event, the claim is precluded as a matter of law and extinguished at 
the summary judgment stage). 
 275. See id. at *7 (explaining that the burden to show that the facts are not 
newsworthy is on the plaintiff). 
 276. See id. (stating that a claim that is able to establish that the facts 
reported are not newsworthy would survive summary judgment). 
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sensitive to expect of juries. Judges should be the arbiters of that 
determination, and bright lines should be drawn to determine as a 
matter of law whether facts are newsworthy or not. The First 
Amendment demands a highly deferential test for newsworthiness 
when the case involves a public figure or official.  
An appropriate test could be borrowed from Gilbert v. Medical 
Economics Company,277 essentially allowing for a newsworthy 
designation to be applied to facts pertaining to a public figure or 
official that any reasonable editor would find newsworthy.278 While 
one could argue that judges should not be making this 
determination, I would argue they are far more qualified than 
juries. Judges would be far less likely to react viscerally to the 
sometimes-squeamish facts. They are better equipped to 
distinguish between the privacy rights of public and private actors. 
Juries are too likely to put themselves in the shoes of the public 
figure or official, while judges are trained to apply the law in a far 
more clinical and antiseptic manner. This suggestion is not a novel 
approach. As the Gilbert court quoted in support of its summary 
judgment finding: 
When civil cases may have a chilling effect on First Amendment 
rights, special care is appropriate. Thus, a judicial examination 
at these states of the proceeding, closely scrutinizing the 
evidence to determine whether the case should be terminated 
in a defendant’s favor, provides a buffer against possible First 
Amendment interferences.279 
In this way, the courts could ensure a more standardized result, 
combating the chilling effect this tort can have, and hopefully 
avoiding results like Gawker in the future. 
Another way to prevent this tort from chilling protected speech 
would be to preclude public figures and officials from bringing 
claims without a showing of actual malice. To justify this position, 
                                                                                                     
 277. See Gilbert, 665 F.2d at 309 (affirming summary judgment because 
“under these circumstances the public has a very strong and immediate 
legitimate interest, and the first amendment protects the media's right to reveal 
this information”). 
 278. See id. (describing that claims which infringe upon First Amendment 
must be carefully vetted as to not violate the Constitution). 
 279. Id. (quoting Guam Fed’n of Teachers, Local 1581, of Am. Fed’n of 
Teachers v. Ysrael, 492 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1974)). 
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we borrow the framework The Florida Star v. B.J.F.280 borrowed 
from Daily Mail to determine whether a statute the creates civil 
penalties for speech violates the First Amendment.281 That test 
prevents imposing civil liability when a publication prints lawfully 
obtained, truthful facts unless the statute is narrowly tailored to 
promote a state interest of the highest order.282 While examining a 
civil tort claim, a clear analogy can be drawn between both 
circumstances because both use civil penalties to punish truthful 
speech.283 One can argue that the same poison that defeated 
B.J.F.’s claim is inherent in the publication of a private facts tort 
itself: its means are not narrowly tailored to achieve a state 
interest of the highest order. Both B.J.F.’s claim and the tort lack 
any scienter or actual malice requirement, leading to the same 
“perverse” outcome that the Florida Star court discussed.284  
Because of the similarities these two claims possess, (B.J.F.’s 
negligence per se claim and the publication of private facts tort 
claim) and because of the untenable result that both claims reach 
in their current form, a similar reasoning should be applied to 
both. When one applies the reasoning from Florida Star, the result 
is fairly clear. Gawker legally obtained the information.285 The 
matter was newsworthy because it pertained to a public figure and 
was reasonably related to a matter of public concern.286  
Finally, the means used to punish this speech was civil 
penalties.287 Under the same standard that the court employed in 
                                                                                                     
 280. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (holding that a 
statute cannot impose punishment on a newspaper for publishing the legally 
obtained truthful facts unless the statute is narrowly tailored to serve a state 
interest of the “highest order”). 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. See id. (explaining that this test is appropriate for examining statutes 
that create civil penalties for truthful speech). 
 284. See id. at 539 (discussing that B.J.F.’s claim would impose liability for 
publishing truth at a less strict standard than libel law). 
 285. See Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2014) (explaining that Bollea has never contended that Gawker illegally 
obtained the tape). 
 286. See Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., No. CV 98-0583 DDP (CWx), 1998 
WL 882848, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 1998) (indicating that public curiosity 
surrounding the potential release of a sex tape of a celebrity constituted a 
newsworthy event). 
 287. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 529 (1989) (stating that civil 
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Florida Star it appears that the tort itself violates the First 
Amendment. To cure the tort of its deficiency, it would be prudent 
to narrow the tort by requiring a showing of actual malice when 
the claim is brought by public figures or officials. The requirement 
could help better protect publications against these claims, 
ferreting out and immunizing those stories that have been 
published to further a public interest while still punishing 
malicious publication of private facts that serve no legitimate 
public purpose. Furthermore, it would bring the publication of 
private facts tort more in line with other speech-based tort claims 
brought by public figures or officials.288 Several state supreme 
courts have already questioned the constitutionality of the tort and 
expressed doubts.289 It would be prudent for other state supreme 
courts to examine the tort to determine if it is in line with state 
constitutions. 
VII. Conclusion 
While the problems the tort of publication of private facts 
present can seem complicated, when boiled down to it, the policy 
implications are quite clear: whether it accords with our 
interpretations of the First Amendment to allow a publication to 
be sued into non-existence for publishing lawfully obtained 
truthful facts. When question is broken down into small parts, the 
answer is apparent. This supposition cannot possibly comport with 
public policy, our nation’s interest in the free exchange of ideas, or 
the First Amendment. Something clearly needs to be done to bring 
this tort into line with constitutional jurisprudence. The next time 
                                                                                                     
damages were awarded to the plaintiff). 
 288. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (illustrating 
that, to prevail on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, a public 
figure must show “actual malice”). 
 289. See Anderson v. Fisher Broad. Companies, Inc., 712 P.2d 803, 805 (Or. 
1986) (explaining the potential constitutional issues that the tort presents but not 
ruling on those issues because they could vacate the damages under different 
grounds); see also Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 691 (Ind. 1997) 
(stating that the “Indiana Constitution commands real caution about proposals 
to recognize a civil cause of action for libel that impose liability for truthful 
statements”). 
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this issue arises, we may be defending the New York Times’ or the 
Washington Post’s right to print potentially embarrassing truthful 
facts about public figures and officials.  
Given the current climate in the executive branch, with their 
adversarial approach to the media, it has never seemed more 
necessary to extend additional protections to our media. By 
changing the summary judgment standard, or by disallowing the 
tort to be brought by public figures or officials without a showing 
of actual malice, we could take one small step in making sure that 
the miscarriage of justice that occurred in Florida will never 
happen again. 
